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ABSTRACT Assuring the quality of international auditing is important in the current, globalized business/economic environment. High-quality international auditing efforts promote
greater confidence in financial statements, and therefore promote greater movement of capital.
Ensuring high-quality auditing efforts is the task of auditing regulation efforts, among others.
Several potential determinants of the strength of these efforts were postulated in Kleinman et al
(2014). The postulated determinants of interest include national culture, religion, legal code
origin, and financial market liquidity. The authors, however, did not test the relationship of the
postulated determinants to auditing enforcement efforts. This study undertakes the task of
investigating such relationship empirically, using the Brown et al (2014) measures of auditing
enforcement efforts. We find that comparative religious affiliation, religion’s importance, culture, legal code, and the financial variable of market liquidity were determinants of auditing
enforcement efforts. The implications of these findings are presented.
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The quality of public company audits has been
of great concern for years. The drumbeat of
audit failures and scandals, most notably exem-
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plified by the Enron and Worldcom debacles in
the Unites States; the Ahold and Parmalat failures in Europe; the Resona bank audit failure in
Japan and the HIH insurance company failure in
Australia, has heightened public and regulatory
concern over both the quality and integrity of
public company audits across the globe. These
auditing issues led to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of
2002 in the United States and, in the European
Union, the European Council Commission
Directive 84/253/EEC, effective in (2006).
Similar legislation was enacted elsewhere.
Kleinman et al (2014), hereafter KLP (2014),
argue that the growing internationalization of
business introduces new challenges to the confidence that investors can place in the audit
opinion. Specifically, KLP (2014) argue that
national auditing regulation and the effectiveness of auditing is affected by religion, culture,
legal code, nature of accounting principles
approved for use in each nation (e.g., IFRS, a
variant of IFRS, and US GAAP) and the sources
of auditing standards, e.g., IFAC’s ISA, or a
variant thereof, or US PCAOB (e.g., Anandarajan and Kleinman, 2015). In addition, as
Kissinger (2014) notes, ‘‘For nations, history
plays the role that character confers on human
beings.’’ Thus, additional sources of variation
exist in that national history itself adds a
dynamic to national behavior that flavors the
interpretation of financial and auditing standards, common agreements as to regulatory
practice, and even perceptions of what falls
within the boundaries of regulation, or fails to
do so. National history, of course, is subject to
infinite variation, both across nations and even
within nations and therefore provides a rich
ground for research. Landes (1998), for example, argues that cultural, religious doctrines, as
well as local cultural inheritances, disparate
economic geographies, climate and soil character, have led to varying patterns of government
control of the economy and economic development (see also Fukuyama, 2014).
The KLP paper argues for a systematic program of research, the objective of which is to
understand the interactions between national

cultures, religious affiliation, legal systems, and
audit enforcement regimes. KLP’s argument
was qualitative. Here, we address most of these
issues empirically. The importance of such an
approach is underlined by Gordon et al (2013)
who note that ‘‘non-US audit markets can differ
from the US markets in that the objective of the
audit function varies (p. 143)’’. Gordon et al
(2013) specifically note that audits conducted
outside the US may differ, even when the audits
are conducted using the same ‘Big N’ name.
The authors argue, therefore, for the adequate
characterization of local audit markets, with
respect to the relationship between auditing and
financial reporting quality.
Understanding the differences in financial
statement quality, as influenced by audit regulation of the auditors who help to ensure financial
statement quality, given different regulatory
regimes and enforcement levels is therefore vital
in understanding the comparability of accounting
numbers produced cross-nationally. Defond and
Zhang (2014) provide an extremely comprehensive review of the literature on audit quality.
They note that research on the impact of regulation on audit quality is scant. Accordingly, a
great need exists to research issues related to
regulation and audit quality. However, in the
same year Brown et al published their research on
the impact of regulation on audit quality and
hence financial accounting quality. Using hand
collected data from various sources, Brown et al
(2014, p. 10) construct audit enforcement index
which measures both audit regulatory and
enforcement activities. The index includes nine
items as follows: (1) Whether the auditors must
be licensed; (2) whether there are more extensive
license requirements, (3) required ongoing professional development; (4) having quality assurance programs in place; (5) whether an audit
oversight body exists; (6) whether the oversight
body can apply sanctions; (7) whether audit
partners or firms must be rotated; (8) the level of
audit fees; and (9) the level of litigation risk for
auditors.
Brown et al (2014) and their subsequent
study Preiato et al (2015) show that the audit
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enforcement index that they construct has a
positive impact on accounting quality. The
impact of audit regulation on accounting
quality must be through its impact on audit
quality. We do not address these issues here.
Our interest is in the determinants of the
national choice to institute stronger audit regulatory regimes. Stronger audit regulatory
regimes—as defined by Brown et al (2014)—
have been shown to have a positive impact on
audit quality and therefore on accounting
quality. Since regulatory systems within a
nation, as partially shown in the KLP paper,
hold across the nation, it is important to
understand the determinants of regulatory
schemes cross-nationally. The issues addressed
here, therefore, include the impact of religion,
religious importance, key cultural dimensions,
and legal system (i.e., civil code countries
versus common law countries) and market
liquidity on audit regulatory structure, using
the Brown et al’s (2014) audit index.
We make several contributions to the literature on audit regulation. First, we provide evidence of the impact of culture on the strength of
regulatory enforcement in auditing. Second, we
examine the impact of religion and its importance
to individuals within the studied nations on regulation (e.g., Reuter, 2011). The tenets of religious faith, when strongly held—here as
measured by importance—may have important
impacts on behavior. Understanding the impact
of faith is important, given that current projections are for the world’s religions to grow at
different rates (e.g., http://m.livescience.com/
50370-worlds-religious-population-will-grow.
html?cmpid=NL_LS_weekly_2015-04-03).
This is a question never before addressed in the
auditing literature. Third, we examine the
impact of law source (i.e., common law versus
civic code) on regulation. Again, does a purportedly strong investor protection system said
to be resident in common law jurisprudence act
seem to obviate the need for a strong audit
regulatory system? Or are both useful adjuncts
in helping to secure a better outcome for the
investing community? This, too, is a question
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not fully addressed elsewhere. Understanding
the interplay between law category and regulatory choices may lead to better regulatory
choices than is possible without understanding
that impact. A final contribution is the examination of capital market quality on regulation.
We assume that nations with more liquid capital
markets are more motivated to bear the burden
of greater regulatory efforts. We address the
question of whether this assumption is empirically true here by examining the relationship of
market liquidity to audit enforcement. Understanding the relationship between market liquidity and regulatory efforts is important
because of the implications such a relationship
would have, given a particular state of the
capital markets, and the choice to make
regarding further regulatory efforts.
In ‘‘Literature Review and Hypotheses’’
section, we present our literature review and
hypotheses. In ‘‘Methodology’’ section, we
present our data sources and methodology. In
‘‘Results’’ section, we present our data analyses.
In ‘‘Discussion and Conclusions’’ section, we
present our conclusions.

LITERATURE REVIEW
AND HYPOTHESES
In this section, we present our literature review
and hypotheses. The variables under study are
consistent with emphases in cross-national
research published previously. Gordon et al
(2013) note that (p. 145) ‘‘It is well noted in
prior literature that a country’s accounting
standards and practices are the result of a
complex interaction of cultural, historical,
economic, and institutional factors…’’ Our
study captures key factors of this sort.
The enormous variation between nations in
how these factors combine to influence auditor
and regulatory behavior suggest the importance
of attempting to achieve standardized auditing
regulation. It also suggests the difficulty in
achieving such regulation. An iron cuff fits all
auditing practitioners equally, but is that the
same with regulation when the perceptions of
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enforcement agents may be influenced by so
many things? Herman (2013, pp. 475–476,
discussing John Stuart Mill), for example, notes
that ‘‘…the social world around us is not just the
result of wrongheaded thinking or systematic
injustice… It reflects a complex organic historical development and consists of institutions
that give meaning to the lives of ordinary people…’’ And as Wilson (1993) states, ‘‘For
some…anthropologists, man is the product of
culture, symbols, and roles. He is embedded in
familial and communal ties and acquired his
identity from a web of relationships that is
endowed with meaning by tradition and ritual;
culture determines the meanings he assigns to
the world about him. Man has no nature other
than an ability to acquire a culture. Clifford
Geertz has put it, in his words, ‘most bluntly’:
‘there is no such thing as a human nature
independent of culture.’’’
In addressing this issue, KLP address a very
important question: How are auditing regulatory efforts to be judged? Are the words or
requirements of an audit regulator to be taken
at face value or may there be discrepancies in
what is enforced, if not required? What is it, if
anything, that gives us confidence that the
auditing regulatory efforts of country A are
equivalent to those of country B? The authors
state in their abstract that they:
…begin by describing the cross-national
institutions (e.g., the International Federation of Accountants [IFAC]) that impact
national regulatory choices. Then we survey the audit regulatory practices of public
company auditors of a select group of
major economic powers and based on this
analysis, we discuss the challenges and
obstacles to engaging in intra-national
audit, cross-national audit/inspections and
the challenges posed by differences in
auditing standards used in various linked
(e.g., by joint ventures, etc.) nations. We
include in this discussion the effects of
national culture, investor legal protections,
and differing financial standard sources.

The KLP paper, which discussed the impact
of religion as well, was an ambitious attempt to
catalog potential influences on the success of
the audit regulatory effort. It draws an important part of its inspiration from the auditorenmeshed-in-a-web work of Kleinman and
Palmon (2001). KLP cite Kleinman and Palmon (2001) in their theoretical study of factors
affecting individual and audit firm independence within a single nation. The latter argue
that ‘‘auditors are enmeshed in webs of work
sites, professional organizations, family and
communities, and culture and religion, with
the strands of these webs potentially pulling the
individual in different directions (p. 78).’’ In
KLP’s terms, the impact of the listed factors
causing enmeshment of individual auditors
argued for in KP’s book are potentially dwarfed when the impact on behavior in cross-national settings is considered. With that
expansion in scope, religions, cultures, legal
systems, and international competitive conflicts
over capital become germane, as does the
availability of resources to pursue regulatory
agendas. Herman (2013) and Wilson (1993)
noted the complex interactions of history,
institutions, relationships and the effect of such
interactions within a nation or culture on
behaviors within that nation or culture. Such
institutions may, of course, include religious,
cultural, economic and legal ‘facts of life’ that
individuals confront as they move through
their everyday lives, institutions that shape the
further development of the nations within
which they are embedded. This, of course,
includes the development of regulatory institutions. The catalog of audit regulatory tools
used in the nine nations studied by KLP should
be of use to researchers. While KLP do note
potential difficulties in harmonizing auditing
regulation cross-nationally due to such
between nation factors as religion, culture, and
legal systems, they do not provide empirical
evidence on the matter.
In this paper, we address empirically the
questions raised by KLP using a sample of 46
countries, countries whose auditing regula-
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tory efforts were categorized for the years of
2002, 2005 and 2008 by Brown et al (2014)
based on regulatory activity and survey data
with respect to the structure of auditing and
accounting enforcement activities. As mentioned earlier, the index includes 9 items
ranging from auditor licensing requirements,
independent audit oversight, and auditor
rotation to auditor litigation risk. The authors
state that these data were collected from
public sources. These sources include IFAC
surveys of its members, the Review of Standards and Codes (ROSC) data compiled by
the World Bank, and also from publicly
released data of auditing regulators, and
security market regulators. Brown et al (2014)
note that using prior legal indices to capture
regulatory effects on various enforcements
was not enough. Previous regulation and
enforcement proxies were too broad. They
were not able to capture the specific regulatory enforcement activities that occurred in
the post-Sarbanes–Oxley period. In their
preliminary results, they report that their
auditing and accounting enforcement indices
‘‘have additional explanatory power (over
more general legal proxies) for country-level
measures of economic and market activity,
financial transparency and earnings management.’’ Brown et al do not investigate the
determinants of these regulatory/enforcement
choices. We do this here. Specifically, we
marry these data to data on religious values for
these nations, cultural data, legal code data,
and data on capital market liquidity. As Gordon et al (2013, p. 143) state, ‘‘non-U.S. audit
markets can differ from the U.S. audit market
in that the objective of the audit function
varies (see e.g., IAASB 2006) and audit
objectives and reporting requirements change
over time (see e.g., DeFond et al, 2000).
Without adequate characterization of the local
audit market, documented significant relations
between, say, audit quality and financial
reporting attributes, could be due to spurious
correlation.’’
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Religion
We begin with religion. Individual belief and
involvement with religion, and its importance
in shaping individual behavior, has been noted
since the publication of Protestant Ethics by the
great sociologist Weber (2005 [1905], cited in
Hess (2012)). The impact of religion on society
is well presented by Gottschall (2012), citing
Durkheim.1 First, religion is said to define a
group which provides group members with a
‘unified system of beliefs and practices.’ Second, Durkheim continues, religion ‘coordinates behavior within a group, setting up rules
and norms, punishments and rewards.’ Third,
Durkheim writes, ‘religion provides a powerful
incentive system that promotes group cooperation and suppresses selfishness.’ Gottschall
(2012) concludes by quoting Nicholas Wade
who wrote, ‘‘the evolutionary function of
religion ‘is to bind people together and make
them put the group’s interest ahead of their
own.’’’ Accordingly, it is important to examine
the impact of religion on audit regulatory
enforcement structure creation. Do different
religions pull members in different directions,
in comparison to the reference group?
The literature contains much research
showing that religious affiliation affects individual behavior. Klaubert (2010) notes Guiso
et al’s (2003) study, based on World Values
Survey data, showing that individual attitudes
towards trust, competition and thriftiness were
associated with the religious affiliation of the
individuals surveyed. In particular, Guiso et al
(2003: cited in Klaubert, 2010, p. 2) is said to
have found that ‘‘religious people, among
others, are less willing to break the law, believe
more in the fairness of the market and have less
progressive attitudes towards working
women.’’ That said, however, Klaubert (2010,
p. 2) goes on to note that ‘‘large deviations
often exist during the translation of values and
beliefs into concrete actions and behavior.’’
Klaubert notes that social pressures may affect
the relationship between religion and concrete
actions and behavior. It may also be that eco-
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nomic pressures and changing perceptions of
acceptable versus unacceptable behavior, based
on trends in popular culture and debate, may
alter the relationship between religion and
concrete actions and behaviors as well (see also
Durant and Durant, 1968, and Wilson, 1993).
Therefore, there may be no one-to-one correspondence between religious belief and
involvement and individual behaviors. Particular values may not lead to particular behaviors. In addition, as Klaubert (2010, p. 7) notes,
while religious doctrines may favor behavior X
over behavior Y, ‘‘Religions…differ [with
respect to] their enforcement mechanisms,
[and] with respect to the strictness of the
enforcement of the norms and rules.’’ Further,
Biddle (1979, cited in Kleinman and Palmon,
2001, p. 47) notes that some norms are more
pivotal than others, violations of which presumably lead to more severe sanctions when
such violations are observed. Thus there may
be only a loose connection between values and
behaviors, with the link attenuated by social
and other pressures and the possible severity of
sanction for an observed failure to respect a
religious value.
The importance of religion in shaping
individual behavior and ethical organizational
practices is also argued for in KLP, and shown
in studies by Mensah (2014) and others.
Mensah (2014) examined the relationship of
culture and religion to perceived levels of
corruption.2 He uses the Protestant religion as
his benchmark in his evaluation of the impact
of religion on corruption. He states that he
does this because of prior literature that
examines the relationship of Protestantism and
corruption. Thus, the coefficients for the religious variables show how other religions
compare to the Protestant religion.3 Mensah
(2014) finds that the Protestant, Buddhist and
Hindu adherent percentages were associated
with reduced corruption, while other Christian
religions, Islam and other religions or no religion percentage of followership in his sample
countries were associated with greater corruption. Religion is also long considered to

have an influence on policy making and the
establishment of laws. La Porta et al (1999)
present evidence that countries having high
proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit
poorer government performance. Stulz and
Williamson (2003) finds that religion is a better
predictor for creditor rights and the enforcement of rights and accounting standards than
other predictors such as a country’s natural
openness to international trade, its language, its
income per capita, or the origin of its legal
system. Hence, religion appears to have the
purported effects by creating inhibitions against
unethical behaviors. If so, are such inhibitions
sufficient, and seen as sufficient, to obviate the
need for regulatory walls against untoward
behaviors? Perhaps religious feeling, however
intense, and dominating of worldview only
affects behavior clearly within the realm of
religion—such as temple attendance—but fails
to influence other, clearly secular behaviors,
with the latter more affected by reason (Herman, 2013) or considerations related to
potential advantages or felt obligations (Wilson, 1993)? In the context of this study, given
its cross national nature, the number of religions involved, the existence of important
economic factors and the likelihood that social
pressures may vary widely among settings (e.g.,
Wilson, 1993; Durant and Durant, 1968), it is
difficult to draw conclusions from these earlier
findings. A much more sweeping look at the
impact of religion on behavior, not only cross
nationally but through several millennia, is
provided in the work of Durant and Durant
(1968). Will and Ariel Durant were historians
notably famous for their eleven-volume Story
of Civilization, a history that covered many
civilizations on several continents, reviewing in
sum some 5000 years of human history. In
their 1968 book, The Lessons of History, Durant
and Durant (1968, e-book edition, page
number not provided) write that
…Generally religion and puritanism prevail in periods when laws are feeble and
morals must bear the burden of main-
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taining social order; skepticism and
paganism (other factors being equal) progress as the rising power of law and government permits the decline of the
church, the family, and morality without
basically endangering the stability of the
state.
Corruption, or lack of active morality, is a
more general phenomenon than that studied
by Klaubert (2010) and Hess (2012), although
Hess (2012) does note the association between
being in areas with stronger religious norms
and higher ethical standards. In Mensah’s
(2014) results, it seems that percentages following one religion or another are positively or
negatively associated with the perception of
corruption in the nations in his sample. Do,
therefore, higher religious values negate the
need for structural controls over bad corporate
behavior? A key question then is: Is this necessarily true with respect to the more abstract
functioning of auditing as these affect the
operations of firms within different nations?
Or, are good fences (active regulatory activity)
also needed? That in addition to having
neighbors who abhor the thought of violating
your property boundaries, should one also have
fences to fend off such violations as well—just
in case, perhaps? Do, therefore, strong
injunctions against bad behavior also lend
themselves to strong support for institutions to
protect against the occurrence of such behavior? Or does the presence of strong normative
(religious-based, here) injunctions against bad
behavior lead to a perception that such strong
institutional controls on bad behavior are not
needed, with the result that they are not put
into place? Given this, we offer the null
hypothesis that
H1 Religion will not be associated with the

level of auditing regulatory enforcement.
That said, Wilson (1993), on the one hand,
notes that religious doctrines, whether drawn
from Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam or
Confucianism, have much in common. He
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notes that a list of virtues or duties drawn up by
any of these would not differ greatly from a list
drawn up by any other of these religions.4 On
the other hand, the importance of religion, any
religion, may vary from piddling to very
important, an idea addressed in Hess (2012)
and Durant and Durant (1968). Klaubert
(2010) found that religion did affect personal
saving behaviors, but noted that social pressures
may affect the link. He also noted that variations in different religion’s ‘enforcement’ may
affect behavior as well. While Klaubert (2010)
discussed religious identifications, his study did
not consider the strength with which religious
beliefs were held. Hess (2012) addresses this
issue. In particular, Hess (2012) studied the
relationship between high religious norms and
levels of credit card debt, foreclosures, and
bankruptcies. He found that individuals in
areas with higher religious norms, with norms
being a group property not an individual one
although stronger norms have stronger impacts
on individual behavior than weaker norms, had
less credit card debt, as well as fewer
bankruptcies and foreclosures. Hess (2012) also
notes that earlier research found that individuals in areas with stronger religious norms also
had higher ethical standards and took fewer
risks. Further, religiosity is also found to affect
corporate decision making at the micro-level.
Hilary and Hui (2009) find that firms located in
U.S. counties with high religiosity level are
associated with lower risk exposure measured
as the variance in equity return and in ROA.
McGuire et al (2012) was among the first that
examines directly the impact of religion on
financial reporting behavior using U.S. firms.
They find that firms headquartered in areas
with strong religious social norms generally
have fewer cases of financial reporting irregularities and are associated with lower accounting risk. Both of these studies focus on a single
country (the US); hence, the firms in their
sample are operated in a very similar legal and
economic environment. A country predominantly Protestant, in this formulation, might
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perhaps be considered to be more likely to
employ stronger regulatory enforcement since
such behavior would enhance the preference
for low corruption in the financial reporting
environment. That said, though, a country of
predominantly Protestant orientation may not
give force, ad arguendo, to a preference for
achieving low corruption in the financial
reporting environment through employment
of regulatory enforcement if individuals within
the country did not feel religion was very
important to them. If stronger felt importance
of religion is associated with higher ethics,
perhaps there will be a perception that more
money need not be spent on regulatory
activity, i.e., that individuals and organizations
will self-police? To date, we have not found
empirical studies on this question. Accordingly,
we test the importance ascribed to religion by
individuals in affecting levels of regulatory
enforcement here. To do so, we offer the
following null hypothesis:
H2 The importance ascribed to religion by

individuals will not be associated with the
level of auditing regulatory enforcement.

Culture
National culture is another major factor
affecting the behavior of individuals in a
nation. The most popular characterization of
national cultures is that of Hofstede (1980).
Hofstede and Bond (1988, p. 6; cited in
Kanagaretnam et al (2014)) describe culture as
‘‘the collective programming of the mind that
distinguishes the members of one category of
people from those of another. Culture is
composed of certain values, which shape
behavior as well as one’s perception of the
world.’’ Cowperthwaite (2010) notes that there
is substantial and increasing evidence that
learned cultural traits affect all aspects of our
lives. The role of culture in shaping behavior
and perceptions is vital here. National culture
has also been considered an influential factor
that affects the development of accounting and
financial reporting systems in a country and

explains the variances in accounting practices
across countries. Gray’s (1988) theoretical
framework postulates the effect of national
cultural values, specifically power distance,
individualism and uncertainty avoidance, as
defined by Hofstede (1980) on such accounting values as professionalism, uniformity,
conservatism, and transparency. Many
researchers have since tested Gray’s (1988)
hypotheses in their empirical studies (see the
literature review by Doupnik and Tsakumis,
2004). The power of culture to shape behavior
and perceptions argues that differences in
national culture may affect the consistency of
interpretations of regulation across national
boundaries (see also KLP, 2014, and Wilson,
1993). If so, then even the common wording
of an auditing standard, one adhered to across
national boundaries, may be perceived and
therefore acted upon differently. Homogenizing the wording of auditing standards, or
indeed financial accounting standards, may fail
to achieve the objective of ensuring uniform
auditor/preparer actions in response to common presenting circumstances. Wording may
be homogenized, but the understanding of the
wording may not. For instance, the Report on
the Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSC)—Accounting and Auditing released
by the World Bank finds that in China ‘‘some
corporate accountants and auditors face considerable difficulties in applying the concepts of
fair value and impairment losses in implementing applicable standards’’ despite the
country’s conversion efforts to the IFRS
(ROSC, 2009). Further, the identity of culture
as values may also drive behaviors—even given
the same presenting stimuli—to different ends
(e.g., Wilson, 1993). Cowperthwaite (2010,
p. 175), for example, notes—with respect to
International Standards on Auditing implementation, that, ‘‘Some countries may have
difficulty with implementation because of the
differences between their cultural assumptions
and those embodied in the standards to be
adopted.’’ The author suggests that practitioners may, therefore, interpret these international
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standards based on their particular cultural
backgrounds. These aspects of culture are not
noted in the current literature but are vital
toward understanding how audit practice may
differ across national settings. Cowperthwaite
(2010) states that the impact of these differences on auditing is unknown. Understanding
the differences in this impact is very important
since it necessarily will have an impact on how
auditors implement the standards authorities
have chosen for them to implement (e.g.,
either ISA as originally written, ISA subject to
local adaptation, US or other GAAS, etc.).
Culture, of course, may not only affect the way
auditing standards are interpreted, but also
perceptions of the need for rigor in enforcement of such standards as are in force.
We use Hofstede’s categories because of
their widespread use. While it has been argued
that countries may be internally diverse,
Cowperthwaite (2010, p. 179) states that while
‘‘countries are often made up of more than one
culture, …Hofstede has demonstrated…a
country can be treated as a single culture
because in most cases everyone in the same
country is subject to similar educational, legislative, and political systems and follows a
single set of laws. These commonalities reinforce social norms, making countries for the
most part an acceptable proxy of cultures.’’
We focus here on Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance and Uncertainty
Avoidance because Gray’s (1988) theoretical
framework argues that these three cultural
dimensions are the most important societal
values that affect the accounting subculture and
are most germane to the choice of regulatory
structure. For these, two competing forces may
be at work. National/cultural forces may lead
to a belief that rigorous regulation is not
important, that communal feelings or notions
of a national identity are enough to dissuade
individuals from game playing. Such cultural
forces may have an important impact on
behavior because, as Durant and Durant (1968,
e-book edition, no page number) state:
‘‘…customs or institutions of…society…are
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the wisdom of generations after centuries of
experiment in the laboratory of history.’’
With respect to the individualism/collectivism (IND) dimension, greater cultural collectivism as opposed to individualism [one scale
in the Hofstede measure of national culture,
the Hofstede measure being the most commonly used measure in the finance literature
(e.g., Reuter, 2011)] may lead to adoption of
either a weaker or stronger enforcement
apparatus. Hofstede defines individualism ‘‘as a
preference for a loosely knit social framework
in which individuals are expected to take care
of only themselves and their immediate families.’’ Hofstede (2001) is noted as holding that
(see Kanagaretnam et al, 2014, p. 1120), ‘‘High
IND cultures also emphasize individual
achievements, self-orientation, and autonomy.’’ Its opposite, collectivism, ‘‘represents a
preference for a tightly-knit framework in
society in which individuals can expect their
relatives or members of a particular in-group to
look after them in exchange for unquestioning
loyalty.’’ (http://geert-hofstede.com/nationalculture.html) Greater collectivism (weaker
individualism) may lead to a weaker enforcement apparatus if it is believed that higher
regulation sheds doubt on the commitment of
individuals within the culture to the greater
collectivity. On the other hand, greater collectivism may lead to greater regulation if it is
believed within the culture that shaming
individuals within the nation may be insufficient to deter enough individuals from taking
advantage of other members of the culture.
Greater regulation then becomes a clear signal
of the values of the community to the community. Greater individualism (weaker collectivism) may lead to the adoption of a weaker
enforcement apparatus since such regulatory
tools may be seen to diminish individual freedom to seek one’s best interest. Greater individualism, on the other hand, may also lead to
cries for and implementation of stronger regulation if only to serve as a fence to corral selfseeking, individualistic impulses out of fear of
damage to others. The unfettered pursuit of
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unbridled individual interest, even if a cultural
value, may be seen as harmful to the broader
polity. Accordingly, we offer this hypothesis:
H3 Individualism (IND) will not be associated

with the level of auditing regulatory
enforcement.
A second key cultural dimension is that of
power avoidance. Hofstede (1984, p. 83–84)
refers power distance (PD) as ‘‘the extent to
which the members of a society accept that
power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally. People in large power
distance societies accept a hierarchical order in
which everybody has a place which needs no
further justification. The fundamental issue
addressed by this dimension is how society
handles inequalities among people when they
occur.’’ In addition, Hofstede identified a
global relationship between power distance and
collectivism. Collectivist countries always
show large power distance, although individualist countries do not always show small
power distance (Choi, 2002). Greater power
distance may privilege those with the ability to
command resources in society with a relief
from pressure by others within society, afraid
to challenge any potential inequities or who
accept the inequities. Such a situation may lead
to minimal regulation since it may be thought
that the natural order within the society is for
those with power to manipulate the situation
to favor themselves. A resultant expectation,
therefore, would be that greater power distance
would be associated with less regulation.
Individual or collective acceptance of the
hierarchical order, however, need not dictate
individual behavior that defies personal financial logic. That is, individuals may indeed
accept that, should they invest in the markets,
their investments would be vulnerable to
exploitation or appropriation by powerful
economic actors in society. Just because they
might accept that, however, does not mean
that they will invest in the markets anyway.
Placing available, investable funds in a safetydeposit box or some other long term mode of

safeguarding assets would very likely be seen as
a more palatable option. If so, then, the failure
of higher power distance societies to develop
stronger regulatory institutions would lead to
less trust in the markets and less capital formation, at least as mediated through the stock
and bond markets. While capital allocation
may still occur, the perceived lack of reliable
financial information may result in poorer
capital allocation and slower economic growth,
if any.
Given the drive toward greater global economic integration during the 2000s, and the
need to satisfy populations seeking the
improved standards of living widely thought to
result from greater productivity growth, itself
an argued outcome of more efficient and
effective capital allocation, the governing elites
even within higher power distance nations may
institute stronger auditing regulations to foster
more efficient capital allocation through more
efficient capital markets. The perceived
strength of auditing regulation, of course,
serves both internal-to-the-society functions
and external-to-the-society functions. For
example, the constant search for foreign direct
investment may lead even greater power distance societies to promote stronger auditing
regulation in order to garner such investment.
We proffer, therefore, a null hypothesis with
respect to the relationship between power
distance and greater auditing regulation.
H4 Power distance (PD) will not be associated

with the level of auditing regulatory
enforcement.
A third key cultural dimension is that of
uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede (2001, p. 148)
states that ‘‘uncertainty-avoiding cultures shun
ambiguous situations. People in such cultures
look for structure in their organizations, institutions and relationships, which makes events
clearly interpretable and predictable.’’ Gray
(1988) posits that low uncertainty avoidance
societies are more tolerant of ambiguity and
have a preference for independent professional
judgment and fewer rules. Increased or stron-
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ger regulation should decrease the level of
uncertainty individuals feel when contemplating the quality of market investments. It would
seem, then, that uncertainty avoidance should
be positively related to seeking additional
regulation (e.g., Sully de Luque and Javidan,
2004, who report that higher uncertainty
avoidance is linked to more, and more precise,
laws and regulations). Of course, giving greater
power to the state may result in greater
uncertainty for individuals within the state,
facing the power of the state. Nations may
differ with respect to how they evaluate the
tradeoff. Trust in the state and its benevolence
may be an issue with uncertainty avoidance. It
is impossible, therefore, to trace how the trajectory of the development of national character may impinge on cultural constructs and
reactions to authority-related outcomes. It
should be expected, of course, that such
background factors may cancel out and leave
visible the impact of uncertainty avoidance
itself on national choices of regulation. We
will, therefore, proffer a null hypothesis on this
issue.
Accordingly, we offer the following null
hypothesis.
H5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) will not be

associated with the level of auditing regulatory enforcement.

Legal systems
Religion and culture are very important in that
they provide powerful tools for shaping perceptions as to right and wrong and providing
notions of religious and social sanctions for
violation of what is collectively defined as right
and wrong. In many ways, though, these are
amorphous concepts. The iron hand of the
law, however, is not. Accordingly, KLP note
that legal arrangements may also impact auditor
behavior. They note that legal arrangements
may differ between nations. La Porta et al’s
(1998) breakdown of legal codes into common
law (Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence) and civil or
code law (Napoleonic jurisprudence) has
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drawn great attention in the years since La
Porta et al (1998) published their work. In their
study of code origin and investor protection,
the authors found that countries using common law-based systems were more likely to
provide greater investor protections than were
civil code countries. Brown et al (2014) note
that the common law/civic code distinction
has often been used in the past as a proxy for
enforcement. These proxies have been used,
Brown et al state, ‘‘because they are available
for a range of countries and cover a number of
factors that capture at least some country differences in the setting of financial reporting.’’
The problem with these proxies, it is then
noted, is that they ‘‘focus on elements of the
legal system or securities law and thus may not
capture enforcement in relation to accounting
standards as such and, importantly, changes that
occurred in enforcement practices around the
time of IFRS adoption.’’ Legal systems widely
believed to foster investor protection may also
bring pressure on auditing and enforcement
market participants to self-police. Litigation is
expensive and damaging to individual and firm
reputations. Legal systems that favor investor
interests may, therefore, pressure auditors and
preparers to hew more closely to relevant
accounting and auditing standards. This may
happen independently of enforcement, or
along with enforcement. The value of Brown
et al’s approach is shown in their finding that
their indices capturing auditing and enforcement efforts had additional explanatory power,
that is above that provided by such legal
proxies as legal system origin or legal setting,
with respect to national differences in earnings
management. This is an important result.
While earnings management is a loose proxy
for corporate accounting rectitude and auditor
implementation of auditing standards in that
earnings can be managed just so long as the
result does not result in an ‘unfair’ presentation
of the financial statement results, it does suggest
a corporate willingness to toy with the presentation of their financial outcomes. As KLP
(2014, p. 75) note, however, ‘‘Callen et al
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(2011) argue that once national culture is
accounted for, the relationship [between
common law codes versus civil codes and
investor protection] disappears.’’ KLP note that
‘‘equally critical is the existence of sophisticated, large law firms that have the resources to
effectively sue well-heeled Big 4 auditors. In
the absence of such law firms, enforcement
through private lawsuits is ineffective and the
actions of regulators become doubly important.’’ The relative influence of culture and
legal code, therefore, is important. Too,
according to KLP’s formulation, legal code
provides form but, they ask, does the form
provide substance? We will be able to provide
evidence on that question here.
The overriding question being addressed in
this paper is: what are the determinants of
regulatory input as part of the attempt to assure
audit quality. In 2014, the International Audit
Assurance Standards Board [IAASB] (Financial
Executive, Winter, 2014, p. 9) released its
audit quality framework. The IAASB audit
quality framework argued for the importance
to audit quality of such contextual factors as
laws, regulations, corporate governance and
the financial reporting framework used. There
is, therefore, a great deal of support for the
importance of examining the association
between legal rule sources (civil code, common law) and regulation. Lindahl and
Schadewitz [LS] (2013), however, argue that
La Porta et al’s (1998) categorization of legal
families as either common law-based (based on
judicial decisions) or civil code-based (based on
statutes) is flawed. They argue that La Porta
et al’s (1998) and subsequent research fails to
take into account changes in how law is created within each of the two legal families, the
common law legal family and the civil code
law legal family. LS note that the common law
legal family includes statutory law as a source of
law, that common law legal family law is not
just ‘judge made.’ Similarly, civil code law is
influenced by judicial opinions although the
original presentation propounded by La Porta
et al categorizes it as set by statute, not judicial

opinion. In the US, investor protections are set
both by judicial decisions and by statute (e.g.,
the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and
1934). In France, a civil code country, as noted
by LS, judicial decisions and precedents also
play a role in investor protections. Thus, LS
state, there is a diminishment of the differences
between common law and civil code families
rendering the distinction as more of a historical
than current phenomenon. Others, cited by
LS, argue that there are further breakdowns
possible within the civil code and common law
families. These too are debatable. The very
question of further breakdowns raises the
question of how homogeneous nations are
within these families. If there is a wide variation between nations within the two respective
arenas, then using the civil code/common law
dichotomy may prove a distinction without
difference.
Given the prominence of the common
law/civil code distinction in the literature, we
test for its influence on auditing regulatory
enforcement efforts, as captured by the Brown
et al data. There are several possibilities. One
possibility is that the civil code/common law
distinction may be meaningless or overdone,
that heterogeneity within each family may
result in the categorization as civil code or
common law being meaningless. Thus, no
effect of law family on regulatory enforcement
may be found. Another consideration is that
even if the law family distinction is important
in assuring fairness for investors, that legal
family influences operate independently of the
regulatory enforcement apparatus. Simply put,
the purported greater protections of common
law act to catch abusers of investors independently of the efforts that characterize strong
regulatory enforcement regimes. Thus, the
common law protections supplement those of
the regulatory efforts. On the other hand, it
may be that the common law protections are
alternative stressors to ward off those who
would harm investor interests, perhaps obviating the need for better regulation. This
indeed would be a private solution, avoiding
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expensive government interference.5 We offer,
therefore, the following null hypothesis:
H6 Legal family will not be associated with the

level of auditing regulatory enforcement.

Capital markets
Market liquidity is critical to effective market
functioning. If there are pressures toward isomorphism in the world, those pressures are
toward raising a nation’s economic power and
efficiency through taking measures that promote market liquidity. One way to promote
market liquidity is to reassure investors that the
financial statement numbers provided have
integrity. Such an assurance is provided, for
example, by better corporate governance and
by auditing. Bar-Yosef and Prencipe (2013),
for example, show that better corporate governance is associated with higher market liquidity for stocks, measured as the reduction of
the bid-ask spread for the stocks. Such a
reduction in the bid-ask spread indicates a
greater evenness of demand between buyers
and sellers, an efficient allocation of economic
resources, perhaps due to greater buyer confidence in the value of the shares proferred. BarYosef and Prencipe (2013) investigated the
relationship between Sarbanes–Oxley-mandated internal control auditing evaluation and
market liquidity, as measured by bid-ask
spreads. The authors found that market liquidity was lower for firms with greater internal
control problems, as evaluated under Sarbanes–
Oxley Sects. 302 and 404. Zhou (2007) documented a reduction of bid-ask spread, indicator of improved market liquidity, after the
adoption of new auditing standards in China.
We argue that the desire to maintain effective
market functioning and productive allocation
of capital and risk will call for stronger regulatory enforcement, other things equal. Greater
regulatory enforcement should provide the
noted reassurance to investors (domestic and
foreign) that their investments will be safe, that
the information disclosed to them about their
investments is more likely to be accurate.
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Previous research has shown that nations
whose markets are more developed will have a
better regulatory apparatus and enforcement
mechanism (e.g., La Porta et al, 1997; La Porta
et al, 2006). Accordingly, we hypothesize—in
null form—that:
H7 Markets with greater liquidity will not be

positively associated with greater auditing
regulatory enforcement.
In the next section, ‘‘Methodology’’ section,
we describe our methodology and data sources.

METHODOLOGY
Data
We chose our sample of 51 countries based on
Brown et al (2014). Brown et al (2014) collected data on 51 countries for three years:
2002, 2005 and 2008. These countries are listed in Table 1. Our sample was reduced to 46
countries due to the data availability of our
main explanatory variables. The countries not
included in our sample are marked with an
asterisk in Table 1. Brown et al (2014) created
indexes of auditing and accounting enforcement based on International Federation of
Accountants (IFAC) member survey data,
World Bank Review of Standards and Codes
(ROSC), and data collected from national
securities and auditing regulator websites.
Audit regulation may differ due to self-versusgovernment regulation of auditing, profession
oversight and certification procedures, creation
and source of accounting and auditing standards; reporting and disclosure standards; and
how financial markets are overseen (KLP,
2014). These proxy for auditing enforcement
(which they call AUDIT) consisted of nine
items. They extracted items 1–7 from IFAC
surveys and ROSC reports. The Worldscope
database provided item 8 while the last item,
item 9, was taken from Wingate (1997,
Table 2). Of these items, seven were scored 0
or 2, and the remaining two items were scored
on the continuum from 0 to 2. Brown et al
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Table 1: Names of Nations used in Brown et al
(2014)
Argentinaa
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Konga
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan

Korea (South)
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romaniaa
Russia
Singapore
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwana
Turkey
Ukrainea
United Kingdom
United States

a

Not included in our sample due to data availability.

provide the specific items used in constructing
their AUDIT index in their Table 2. Greater
granularity in the scoring of items reflected the
level of source information available on each
item. Although Brown et al collected data for
three separate years, separated by a three-year
timespan, we focus on the 2008 data since it
just precedes the global financial crisis and is
the latest such data available. We note though
that Brown et al (2014) report that the correlation between AUDIT2002 and AUDIT2005
is 0.900 and between AUDIT2005 and
AUDIT2008 is 0.917 (see Brown et al, 2014,
Table 4).
A concern with the use of the ROSC data
is that the form of the regulatory agency is

discernible from national responses to the
questions. The substance of the regulatory
effort, however, is not so discernible. Perhaps, the regulatory agencies, even though
they have been created and funded, take few
practical steps to perform their responsibilities
or are captured by the industry they regulates
(see, for example, Levinson (12/16/2015)? In
this regard, we note that Brown et al (2014,
p. 1) state, ‘‘Preliminary tests suggest our
indices have additional explanatory power
(over more general legal proxies) for country-level measures of economic and market
activity, financial transparency and earnings
management.’’ In their subsequent study,
Preiato et al (2015) show that their Auditing
enforcement index performs better than
other more general enforcement proxies,
such as La Porta et al (1998) proxies and
Kaufmann et al (2010) rule of law measure, in
predicting the quality of financial information, represented by analyst forecast errors
and dispersion. Accordingly, we regard the
regulatory scaffolding measured by Brown
et al (2014) as effective and next move to
explore the determinants of the adoption of
this scaffolding.
Religion data, by nation, were taken from
Mensah’s (2014, Table 10, p. 281. Mensah
states that he relied on the following sources
for his data on the ‘‘distribution of religious
faith.’’ These sources are given as the Pew
Foundation, Wikipedia.com, CIA Factbook,
specific country Internet websites and general
web searches. The importance of religion data
was obtained from global Gallup Poll research
at http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/reli
giosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx
(Gallup.com, 8/31/2010). Hofstede culture
data were drawn from its official website at
http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html.
Market liquidity is defined as the average total
value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP
for the period 2005–2008 (e.g., La Porta et al,
2006). We extracted the market liquidity data
from Worldbank.
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Table 2: Variable symbols, names and measures
Symbol

Measure

Audit enforcement (AUDIT2008)

Is the sum of auditing-related enforcement measures, as calculated and
reported on in Brown et al (2014)
Change in audit enforcement index scores from 2002 to 2008

Change in audit enforcement
(ChAUDIT08_02)
Individual (IND)

Measure of Individualism/Collectivism, drawn originally from
Hofstede (2001). The higher the score on this measure, the greater
the societal preference for individual self care-taking and
responsibilities, as opposed to that on the collectivism end of the
scale, where there is a greater preference for a more tightly knit
social architecture. Higher scores indicate greater individualism
Power distance (PD)
This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful
members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed
unequally. People in societies exhibiting a large degree of power
distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place
and which needs no further justification. In societies with low
power distance, people strive to equalize the distribution of power
and demand justification for inequalities of power
Uncertainty avoidance (UA)
Measure of the degree to which individuals dislike uncertainty and
ambiguity. Higher scores indicate greater dislike (desire to avoid)
uncertainty and ambiguity
Legal (LEGAL)
Measure of legal origin in sample nations, based on work from La
Porta et al (1998). It equals 1 if the nation is a so-called common law
nation; 0 otherwise
Protestant percentage
Measures the percentage of the population describing themselves as of
(PROT_PCT)
Christian Protestant faith. The specific data used were taken from
Mensah (2014). Specific data sources used by Mensah include the
CIA World Factbook, websites of individual countries, the Pew
Foundation and Wikipedia.Org. Our use of Mensah’s data is subject
to his disclaimer. He states that, given that the data cover the years
from 2000 to 2011, it is assumed that the proportion of the
population professing a specific religion remained constant over this
period of time
Christian other percentage
Measures the percentage of the population describing themselves as
(CHRST_OTH)
other Christian but not Protestant (i.e., Roman Catholic, Greek
and Russian Orthodox, Coptic, etc.). The specific data used were
taken from Mensah (2014). See reference to Mensah’s data
disclaimer in PROT_PCT
Hindu percentage (HINDU_PCT) Measures the percentage of the population describing themselves as of
Hindi religious faith. The specific data used were taken from
Mensah (2014). See reference to Mensah’s data disclaimer in
PROT_PCT
Buddhist percentage
Measures the percentage of the population describing themselves as of
(BUDH_PCT)
Buddhist religious faith. The specific data used were taken from
Mensah (2014). See reference to Mensah’s data disclaimer in
PROT_PCT
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Table 2: continued
Symbol

Measure

Islamic percentage (ISLM_PCT)

Measures the percentage of the population describing themselves as of
Islamic religious faith. The specific data used were taken from
Mensah (2014). See reference to Mensah’s data disclaimer in
PROT_PCT
Measures the percentage of the population describing themselves as
belonging to a religion other than those specifically specified or
individuals professing no religion. The specific data used were taken
from Mensah (2014). See reference to Mensah’s data disclaimer in
PROT_PCT
The importance of religion data was taken from the Gallup Poll
website at Citation: http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/
religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx
Market liquidity which is defined as the average total value of stocks
traded as a percentage of GDP for the period 2005 to 2008 (e.g., La
Porta et al, 2006). Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/
variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
Market_Liquidity2008-Market_Liquidity2002

Other religion percentage
(RELG_OTH)

Importance of religion
(RELIGION_IMPORTANT)
Market liquidity in 2008
(MARKET_LIQUIDITY2008)

Change in market liquidity
(DIF_LIQUID08_02)

Statistical modeling
Main test
We chose to use regression analysis in this
study, with the 2008 audit enforcement index
taken from Brown et al (2014) as the dependent variable and the culture, religion, legal,
and financial variables as the predictor variables. Table 2 provides the definition of variables used in this study. The regression model
is set out below as Eq. 1:
AUDIT2008 ¼ b0 þ b1ðINDÞ þ b2ðPDÞ
þ b3ðUAÞ
þ b4ðPROT PCTÞ
þ b5ðBUDH PCTÞ
þ b6ðISLM PCTÞ
þ b7ðHINDU PCTÞ
þ b8ðRELG OTHÞ
þ b9ðReligionImportantÞ
þ b10ðLEGALÞ
þ b11ðMarket Liquidity2008Þ
þe
ð1Þ

To prevent perfect multicollinearity among
the religion variables (since the percentages for
each country sum to 100 per cent),
CHRST_OTH was left out. CHRST_OTH
includes non-Protestant Christian populations.
It was used as a reference group because its
presence in the regression routine led to significant multicollinearity problems. Its absence
resolved those problems. Removing other
religion percentage indicators instead did not
succeed in reducing the multicollinearity
problem. Thus, the CHRST_OTH data were
used as a reference grouping and the coefficients for the religion variables are relative to
CHRST_OTH with statistically significant
positive values implying that religion contributes positively to the dependent variable
relative to CHRST_OTH.

Test on the change in audit regulatory
enforcement
In the aftermath of Enron and other high-profile
accounting frauds and audit failures, we have
witnessed significant changes in the audit indus-
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for all observations used in regressions (n = 46)

AUDIT2008
IND
PD
UA
PROT_PCT
CHRST_OTH
BUDH_PCT
ISLM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
ReligionImportant
LEGAL
Market_Liquidity2008
ChAUDIT08_02
Dif_MarketLiquid08_02

N

Min

Max

Mean

Std. deviation

46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46

4.000
14.000
11.000
8.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
0.000
5.000
0.000
3.262
-3.000
-33.151

32.000
91.000
100.000
112.000
91.000
95.360
93.000
98.600
80.500
78.600
99.000
1.000
269.322
17.000
110.662

18.957
50.000
55.500
65.565
19.543
36.052
6.677
16.733
2.223
19.097
56.752
0.348
73.142
8.696
22.272

7.823
23.872
21.628
23.614
27.970
34.857
18.203
31.484
11.852
19.799
28.401
0.482
65.326
4.802
29.134

tries and regulatory reforms from 2002 to 2008.
Therefore, we are interested in examining
whether the changes in audit regulation and
enforcement efforts during this period are associated with the main explanatory variables in this
study. Brown et al (2014) provided audit
enforcement data for 2002, 2005, and 2008.
Preiato et al (2015) showed the effectiveness of
their enforcement index in predicting the dispersion of analyst forecasts, at each of these three
data points. In order to test whether the variations in the determinants of audit regulation in
2008 predicted the variation in the change of
strength of audit regulation between 2002 and
2008, we created a change form of our initial
regression, using the differences in our variable
values between 2002 and 2008 as the determinants of the change in audit regulation between
2002 and 2008. Given the enduring nature of
cultural values and religious values and a nation’s
legal system, it was not expected that these values
would change between any two such relatively
close points in time (see Mensah, 2014), and
therefore we did not create a difference version of
the values. The relative proportions of each
nation’s population with adherents to each faith,
as again contrasted with the reference variable
Chrst_Oth and the nation’s score on the culture
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variables should indicate the influence of these
religions and culture elements on the propensity
of a nation to change its regulatory structure over
time. The same holds true for the LEGAL variable. The one variable that might have been able
to change in some significant measure was the
economic variable Market_Liquidity from 2002
to 2008. The other variables are retained in the
regression equation because their levels in
themselves might affect the likelihood that the
level of audit regulation might change from 2002
to 2008.6
As a result, we ran a first difference regression as expressed below.
ChAUDIT08 02 ¼ b0 þ b1ðINDÞ þ b2ðPDÞ
þ b3ðUAÞ þ b4ðPROT PCTÞ
þ b5ðBUDH PCTÞ
þ b6ðISLM PCTÞ
þ b7ðHINDU PCTÞ
þ b8ðRELG OTHÞ
þ b9ðReligionImportantÞ
þ b10ðLEGALÞ
þ b11ðDif Market Liquid08 02Þ
þ e;
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1
-0.085
-0.017
0.052
0.009
0.392***
0.099
0.131

BUDH_PCT

1
0.857***
0.699***
-0.516***
-0.337**
0.432***
-0.060
-0.027
-0.453***
-0.068
0.294**
-0.587***
0.299**
0.575***
0.229

AUDIT2008

1
0.015
-0.374**
0.587***
-0.056
-0.130
0.142

ISLM_PCT

1
-0.157
0.141
0.242
0.000
-0.079

1
0.211
-0.591***
0.205
0.210
0.303**
0.173
0.321**
0.490***
-0.102
-0.338**
-0.156

PD

1
-0.673***
0.067
0.137
0.068

RELG_OTH

1
-0.669***
-0.235
0.565***
-0.061
-0.356**
-0.393***
-0.028
0.292**
-0.535***
0.081
0.411***
0.166

IND

HINDU_PCT

1
0.516***
-0.346**
-0.178
0.264*
0.024
-0.029
-0.421***
-0.072
0.325**
-0.486***
0.306**
0.433***
0.006

ChAUDIT08_02

Two-tailed significance tests. * p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01.

AUDIT2008
ChAUDIT08_02
IND
PD
UA
PROT_PCT
CHRST_OTH
BUDH_PCT
ISLM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
Religion Important
LEGAL
Market_Liquidity2008
Dif_Liquid08_02

AUDIT2008
ChAUDIT08_02
IND
PD
UA
PROT_PCT
CHRST_OTH
BUDH_PCT
ISLM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
Religion Important
LEGAL
Market_Liquidity2008
Dif_Liquid08_02

Table 4: Correlations

1
0.086
-0.349**
-0.168

ReligionImportant

1
-0.504***
0.490***
-0.164
-0.003
-0.211
0.110
0.123
-0.422**
-0.372**
-0.289

UA

1
0.251*
0.134

LEGAL

1
-0.369**
-0.193
-0.293**
-0.102
-0.019
-0.452***
0.059
0.491***
0.269*

1
-0.317**
-0.420***
-0.175
-0.191
0.151
-0.328**
-0.399***
-0.420***

CHRST_OTH

1
0.530***

Market_Liquidity_2008

PROT_PCT
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where ChAUDIT08_02 is the difference
between BPT’s (2014) measure of the audit
regulatory regime in 2008 and 2002. While the
two audit enforcement index scores were
highly correlated (0.832) among our 46 sample
nations, we observed a large change in audit
enforcement index scores during this period
and a t test showed that these scores differed
significantly at \0.1 per cent level. This result
is possible given that correlation measures
consistency of number ordering between two
variables while the t-test measured the
difference between the means of the two
variables, adjusted for the standard deviation of
the means. Thus, you can correlate two series
of numbers (e.g., Series A consisting of the
numbers 1, 2, 3,…, 10 and Series B consisting
of the numbers 1001, 1002, 1003,…,1010) and
find a perfect correlation between them.
Nevertheless, a t-test of their differences in
means would be significant itself.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for
the variables used to test our hypotheses, across
the entire sample with complete data. There
were 46 such observations. Table 4 presents the
listwise Pearson correlation matrix among all the
variables used in this study. It shows the relationship of each variable to AUDIT2008, as
well as the other variables. Specifically, IND and
Market_Liquidity2008 have positive and high
correlations with AUDIT2008. PD and UA and
ReligionImportant, on the other hand, are
negatively correlated with AUDIT2008 at the
p \ 0.01 level. Two religion variables that are
significantly correlated with AUDIT2008 and
ChAUDIT08_02 are PROT_PCT and
RELG_OTH and the correlations are both
positive. ISLM_PCT in comparison is negatively and significantly correlated with AUDIT
2008. Although some of the independent variables are highly correlated with each other, all
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) in the
multiple regression model are at or below 5.
VIF levels of 10.0 (Kennedy, 2000) or above is a
level widely used as an indication of multicollinearity. Further, an additional sign of mul-
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ticollinearity is having a high adjusted
R-squared and few significant variables. Our
regression equation has a high adjusted
R-squared, but 6 of the 11 independent variables are significant at at least the 0.05 level, and
a 7th variable is significant at the 0.10 level. In
addition, while PROT_PCT and RELG_OTH
change signs from the positive correlation with
Audit2008 in the correlation analysis to negative
in the regression analysis, we find that when we
control for culture variables (PD, IND, UA) in
a partial correlation analysis, the correlation sign
on PROT_PCT and Audit2008 becomes
negative. Further, while the correlation
between RELG_OTH and Audit2008 is positive, when we conduct a partial correlation
analysis holding HINDU_PCT constant, the
correlation between RELG_OTH and
Audit2008 becomes negative. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern in our model. We
present our regression results.

RESULTS
The model predicting AUDIT2008 was significant at the p \ 0.001 level. The adjusted
R-squared value for the audit regulation
regression (dependent variable AUDIT2008)
was very high, equaling 0.690. Collinearity
statistics were well within normal range, with
variance inflation factors being below 5, well
below the traditional threshold of 10 for a
multicollinearity determination (Kennedy,
2000). Also, another strong indication that
multicollinearity is not a concern is that 7 of
the 11 variables in the regression were at least
marginally significant (6 variables significant at
the 0.05 level, with one variable significant at
the 0.10 level). We screened our results by
examining the normal probability plots generated by SPSS’s linear regression routine. The
residual analysis demonstrated compliance with
the assumptions of multiple regression analysis.
There was no significant outlier in the data.
Below, we present the results with respect to
AUDIT2008. Please see Table 5.
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Table 5: The impact on cultural, religious, legal
and economic variables on audit regulatory efforts
Audit2008

(Constant)
IND
PD
UA
PROT_PCT
BUDH_PCT
ISLM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
ReligionImportant
LEGAL
MarketLiquidity2008
F
Adjusted R2
R-squared

Coefficient

t-Value

26.697
0.416
0.072
-0.148
-0.401
-0.098
-0.154
-0.158
-0.343
-0.518
0.279
0.343
10.325***
0.69
0.764

3.853***
3.160***
-0.568
-1.259
-2.688**
-0.895
-1.413
-1.720*
-2.363**
-2.956***
2.408**
3.345***

AUDIT2008 ¼ b0 þ b1ðINDÞ þ b2ðPDÞþ
b3ðUAÞ þ b4ðPROT PCTÞ þ
b5ðBUDH PCTÞ þ b6ðISLM PCTÞ þ
b7ðHINDU PCTÞ þ b8ðRELG OTHÞ þ
b9ðReligionImportantÞ þ b10ðLEGALÞ þ
b11ðMarket Liquidity2008Þ þ e
Two-tailed significance tests. * p \ 0.10, **p \
0.05, ***p \ 0.01.

Evaluation of the audit regulatory
enforcement model
Hypothesis 1, which held that religion will not be
associated with the level of auditing regulatory
enforcement (AUDIT2008) was rejected for
PROT_PCT
(p \ 0.05),
HINDU_PCT
(p \ 0.10) and RELG_OTH (p \ 0.05). Compared to the reference group (CHRST_OTH),
PROT_PCT, HINDU_PCT and RELG_
OTH were all negatively related to audit regulatory enforcement (AUDIT2008). The
insignificance of other religion variables,
BUDH_PCT and ISLAM_PCT, shows that
their effect on AUDIT2008 is not statistically
different from CHRST_OTH. Note the signs
on PROT_PCT and RELG_OTH are different
from their correlation signs. This shows the effect
of Protestant affiliation and other religions (in-

cluding Atheism) on AUDIT2008 after controlling for the effect of other independent
variables such as the culture variables in the
multiple regression.
Hypothesis 2, which held that the importance
of religion (RELIGIONIMPORTANT) would
not be related to auditing regulatory enforcement
(AUDIT2008), was rejected at the p \ 0.01
level. Greater reported importance of religion
was negatively related to greater auditing regulatory enforcement. This may indicate that
greater religious attachment may be believed to
obviate the need for greater enforcement efforts
since religious dedication may govern behavior
through the restraining force of strong belief, as
opposed to litigation or threat of government
action. Taking the results of H1 and H2 together,
they suggest that it is both religious identity, as
compared to the reference religion variable
CHRST_OTH, and how important religion is
that affect audit regulation.7
Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5, which held that
national culture—as measured here by Hofstede’s (2001) Individualism/Collectivism (IND),
Power Distance (PD) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) constructs and data respectively—
would not be associated with greater auditing
regulatory efforts (AUDIT2008) was rejected
for Individualism/Collectivism (IND) but not
Power Distance (PD) or Uncertainty Avoidance
(UA). Individualism was positively related to
auditing regulatory efforts at p \ 0.01, while
neither Power Distance (PD) nor Uncertainty
Avoidance (UA) were significantly related to
auditing regulatory efforts. This is a curious
result since it would seem obvious that those
seeking to avoid uncertainty would seek greater
regulation, while greater individualism would
indicate that individuals in society would prefer
to be left to their own devices (e.g., self-regulated peer reviews) rather than have the state see
to their protection. However, greater individualism in a society may trigger a perceived need,
and therefore action to take, greater regulation
in order to reassure the commons that they will
not be taken unfair advantage of by those
seeking greater individual gains. In the context
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of the post-Enron/Anderson era, the highprofile accounting frauds acted as key catalysts
for greater oversight and audit regulatory
reforms around the world. Thus it would be
easier for countries with individualistic culture
to break away from the status quo and undertake major reforms. The result for Power Distance is also curious. Earlier we posited reasons
why greater PD may lead to more regulation or
to less regulation. It seems neither set of reasons
had an impact on the relationship of PD to audit
regulatory efforts, as measured here.
Hypothesis 6, which held that legal family
will not be associated with auditing regulatory
effort was rejected. The Legal variable was
positive and significant at the p \ 0.05 level.
Given the way that Legal was coded, this
indicates that common law legal systems were
significantly more likely to impose greater
audit enforcement than civil code legal systems. This result may stem from a common,
underlying perspective on the importance of
enforcing investor rights and forcing full disclosure through regulatory encouragement of
vigorous auditing. It may also indicate that
regulatory systems are put in place to protect
auditing firms from situations that may bring
them into the courts. While the accounting
profession in the United States, for example,
has long argued for self-regulation as opposed
to government regulation (see, for example,
Kleinman et al, 1998; Lennox and Pittman,
2010), government regulation promises benefits that perceivably more self-indulgent selfregulation does not, including believability of
enforcement rigor (e.g., Anantharaman, 2012).
Hypothesis 7 stated that markets with greater
liquidity, as measured by the market liquidity
(Market_LIQUIDITY2008) variable, would
not be associated with greater regulatory
enforcement efforts. It was rejected at the
p \ 0.01 level. Market liquidity is fostered by
greater trust in the accounting numbers as
achieved through a stronger auditing function,
presumably buttressed by a stronger auditing
regulatory regime.
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Change in audit enforcement
over time
Our hypotheses were designed to frame a test of
the cultural, religious, legal, and financial
determinants of audit regulation (AUDIT2008)
at one point in time. During the course of our
research, we became interested in the determinants of the change in strength of audit regulation over time. Accordingly, we focused on
the post-Sarbanes–Oxley period from 2002 to
2008 because we have observed strengthened
corporate governance, financial reporting and
auditor regulations as well as the creation of
independent audit oversight bodies around the
world during this period.8 Table 6 shows the
results of this effort as depicted in regression
Eq. 2. Our difference regression showed that
Individualism (IND) was positively and significantly related to an increase in audit regulation
(ChAUDIT08_02) at the p \ 0.1 level. Legal
was also positively and significantly related to an
increase in audit regulation at the p \ 0.05
level. The ReligionImportant variable was
negatively associated with an increase in audit
regulation at the p \ 0.05 level. The Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) variable, Power Distance variable and all of the religion variables—
as contrasted with the reference religion category of CHRST_OTH—were not significantly
related to the change in audit enforcement
between 2002 and 2008 (ChAUDIT08_02).
The adjusted R-square for this regression was
0.328, with the model significant at the
p \ 0.01 level. No multicollinearity issues were
detected in the regression run, with the highest
VIF value being 4.431. An inspection of the
residuals indicated that the assumptions of
regression were met.9
Table 7 presents a comparison of the variables that were significant in the main regression, the regression predicting AUDIT2008,
and the presented change regression, the
regression predicting ChAUDIT2008_02. The
final column compares the direction and significance of the two regressions. Table 7
demonstrates that most variables, and analog
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Table 6: The impact on cultural, religious, legal and
economic variables on change in audit regulatory efforts
ChAUDIT08-02

(Constant)
IND
PD
UA
PROT_PCT
BUDH_PCT
ISLM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
ReligionImportant
LEGAL
Dif_Market_Liquid08_02
F
Adjusted R2
R-squared

Coefficient

t-Value

10.998
0.347
0.083
-0.040
-0.218
-0.128
-0.099
-0.179
-0.192
-0.536
0.444
-0.111
2.999***
0.328
0.492

1.748*
1.724*
0.442
-0.231
-0.986
-0.759
-0.575
-1.298
-0.915
-2.084**
2.648**
-0.791

ChAUDIT08 02 ¼ b0 þ b1ðINDÞ þ b2ðPDÞ þ b3
ðUAÞ þ b4ðPROT PCTÞ þ b5ðBUDH PCTÞ þ b6
ðISLM PCTÞ þ b7ðHINDU PCTÞþb8ðRELG
OTHÞ þ b9ðReligionImportantÞ þ b10ðLEGALÞþ
b11ðDif Market Liquid08 02Þ þ e
Two-tailed significance tests. * p \ 0.10, **p \
0.05, ***p \ 0.01.

(difference) variables, were either significant
and directionally consistent in both regressions,
or were non-significant predictors of the criterion variables in both predictions. The variables that differed were PROT_PCT,
HINDU_PCT and RELG_OTH variables,
which were significant in the AUDIT2008
variable but not in the change regression;
ReligionImportant which was negative and
significant in the AUDIT2008 variable level
regression was also negative, significantly so, in
the change regression. MarketLiquidity2008
was significant and positive in the AUDIT2008
variable. Its analog variable (Dif_Liquidity08_02) was not, however, significant in the
change regression.
The comparative analysis shows that there
were no variables that were significant in both
regressions, but with opposite signs. The level
(AUDIT2008) regression had three predictor
variables (PROT_PCT, HINDU_PCT, and
RELG_OTH and Market_LIQUIDITY2008)
that were significant in prediction, but whose
analog variables were not significant in predicting ChAUDIT08_02. The variables that
significantly predicted both (in original form or
difference analog form) are IND and LEGAL

Table 7: Comparison of AUDIT2008 model predictors and change model predictors
Variable (original/change
version)

IND
PD
UA
PROT_PCT
BUDH_PCT
ISLM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
RELIGIONIMPORTANT
LEGAL
Liquidity2008/
Dif_Liquid08_02

AUDIT2008
regression

Pos./\ 0.01
NS
NS
NEG/\ 0.05
NS
NS
NEG/\ 0.1
NEG/\ 0.05
Neg./\ 0.01
Pos./\ 0.05
Pos./\ 0.05

ChAUDIT2008_02
regression

Pos./\ 0.1
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
N/\ 0.05
Pos./\ 0.05
NS

Same direction and significant = Y
& SAME
Nonsignificant (BOTH) = N &
SAME
Different = Different
Y & SAME
SAME
N & SAME
N & DIFFERENT
N & SAME
N & SAME
N & DIFFERENT
N & DIFFERENT
SAME
Y & SAME
Different
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and ReligionImportant. The AUDIT2008
model had an adjusted R-squared of 0.690
while the change model adjusted R-squared
was 0.328. It is clear, therefore, that prediction of the levels model was much stronger
than that of the change model. The fact that
most predictor variables (and their change
analogs) were consistent between the two
variables lends further support to our research
endeavor.

FURTHER ANALYSES
Based on concerns that the results may be
driven by an economically powerful, somewhat culturally cohesive subgroup of nations,
we re-analyzed the AUDIT2008 data in two
ways. First we excluded 6 Anglo-Saxon nations
from the analyses. The Anglo-Saxon nations
excluded were the United States, Canada,
Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and
Ireland. We did not include South Africa
among the 6 Anglo-Saxon nations because,
according to the United Nations (2015) definition of developed nation status (http://www.
un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/
wesp_archive/2015wesp_full_en.pdf, p.150),
South Africa is considered a developing nation.
The model, with an n of 40, had an adjusted
R-squared of 0.513, with an F-value of 4.738
and p = 0.000. The significant variables in this
model included IND (p \ 0.05), PROT_PCT
(p \ 0.05), RELG_OTH (p \ 0.10), RELIGIONIMPORTANT (p \ 0.05), LEGAL
(p \ 0.10)
and
MARKETLIQUIDITY
(p \ 0.05). The signs on these coefficients are
consistent with the main results. The only
difference between these results, which are not
tabled, and the results with the full sample is
that in the restricted, non-Anglo-Saxon sample, HINDU_PCT is not significant, whereas
it is in the full sample reported in Table 5.
In a further analysis, we limited the sample
to just lesser developed nations, categorized
based on the United Nations (2015, p. 150)
criteria. The model results were not valid due
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to very high multicollinearity. The Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) exceeded 10 (Kennedy,
2000). Therefor the results are not interpretable. To address this, we examined the
feasibility of generating factor scores to use in
the regression analysis, allowing both a reduction in the number of variables in the regression to the number of meaningful factors,
determined based on the scree plot, and generation of uncorrelated factors and resulting
factor scores to be used as variable values. In
running the factor analysis, however, the Kaiser-Meyer-Ohlin measure of Sampling Adequacy was just 0.266, far below the
recommended minimal threshold of 0.6 (see
http://statistics.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/output/
principal_components.htm). In contrast to this
result, the model using developed nations
alone had a significant F value of 7.204,
p = 0.001. Though none of the independent
variables have a VIF exceeding 10, several of
them exceed 7. The regression showed an
adjusted R-squared value of 0.638 with only
one variable coefficient significant. This pattern of results, especially with a sample of just
26 nations, suggests multicollinearity. We again
examined the feasibility of generating factor
scores to use in the regression, as with the
developing nations. The Kaiser-Meyer-Ohlin
measure of Sampling Adequacy was 0.521,
again below the recommended minimum
threshold of 0.6. Accordingly, we did not
pursue this further.
In a further attempt to locate any patterns in
the audit enforcement data collected by BPT
(2014), we generated Table 8. Table 8 shows
the change, by nation, in audit enforcement
(per BPT, 2014) from 2002 to 2005, and again
from 2005 to 2008. An inspection of Table 8
reveals that of the 46 nations in the sample, 42
increased the level of regulation from 2002 to
2005, two maintained the same level of regulation (Croatia and Egypt), and two decreased
the level of regulation during that time (Peru
and Jordan). From 2005 to 2008, 28 nations
maintained the same level of auditing regula-
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East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Latin America &
Caribbean
Latin America &
Caribbean

Region

16
12
6
12
4
7
14
4
13
9
2
6
7
9
12
9
10
8
2
8

Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Russian Federation

Slovenia

Turkey

Brazil

Chile

Mexico

12

4

18

14

11

22

11

9

11

30
21
8
26
14
9
20
8
20
11
2

12

4

15

11

11

22

19

6

11

30
21
8
26
18
21
24
11
20
11
14

50

100

125

40

22.2

83.3

22.2

28.6

83.3

87.5
75
33.3
116.7
250
28.6
42.9
100
53.8
22.2
0

0

0

-16.7

-21.4

0

0

72.7

-33.3

0

0
0
0
0
28.6
133.3
20
37.5
0
0
600

5.2

88.3

40

66

22.9

81

AUDIT2002 AUDIT2005 AUDIT2008 Change per Change per Aver. Change per Aver. Change per
cent 2002– cent 2005– cent by Region
cent by Region
2005
2008
2002–2005
2005–2008

Australia
China
Indonesia
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
New Zealand
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Croatia

Nation

Table 8: Changes in audit enforcement by region and year
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Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East & North
Africa
Middle East & North
Africa
Middle East & North
Africa
Middle East & North
Africa
South Asia
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
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9
2
10
9
4
9
7
9
12
12
18
15
10
15
13
7
15
15
7

Peru
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Morocco
India
Pakistan
South Africa
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
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13

24

21

17

23

29

20

27

32

18

11
10
19
18

6

6

24

2

8

24

27

29

17

23

29

20

27

32

22

15
10
19
19

9

6

24

10

11

85.7

60

40

142.9

76.9

93.3

100

80

77.8

50

22.2
42.9
111.1
50

84.6

12.5

38.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

22.2

36.4
0
0
5.6

50

0

-33.3
50

0

400

37.5

140

0

-11.1

18.2
0.0
9.1

111.1
79.7

16.7

32.5

52.2

Kleinman and Lin

Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Western Europe &
North America
Average change per
cent sample wide

Region

Table 8: continued

15
7
14
17
15
18
18

Portugal

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

United States

AUDIT2002

Norway

Nation

32

32

27

25

26

17

25

AUDIT2005

32

32

27

25

26

17

25

AUDIT2008

0
32.8

67.8

0

0

0

0

0

0

Change per
cent 2005–
2008

77.8

77.8

80

47.1

85.7

142.9

66.7

Change per
cent 2002–
2005

66.1

Aver. Change per
cent by Region
2002–2005

22.8

Aver. Change per
cent by Region
2005–2008

Audit regulation in an international setting
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tion. During that same period, 15 nations
increased the level of regulation, with the
remaining three nations decreasing the level of
auditing regulation (Hungary, Turkey and
Brazil). We also calculated the average change
in regulation by region, first from 2002 to
2005, and then from 2005 to 2008. These
changes show that average regulation increased
by 81 and 21.9 per cent respectively for the
years 2002–2005 and 2005–2008 for the East
Asia and Pacific region. For Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, the respective numbers were
40 and 88.3 per cent. For Latin America and
the Caribbean, the change percentages were 66
and 5.2 per cent. For the Middle East and
North Africa, the change percentages were
52.2 and 16.7 per cent. Then for South Asia
(consisting solely of India and Pakistan), the
percentage changes were 32.5 and 18.2 per
cent. The individual percentage changes for
these two nations in frequent conflict can be
seen in the table. Further, the Sub-Saharan
African region consisted solely of the nation of
South Africa, which increased its regulation by
111.1 per cent from 2002–2005, but did not
change regulatory effort from 2005 to 2008. As
to Western Europe and North American audit
regulatory effort changes, from 2002 to 2005,
the regulatory effort percentage increased by
79.7 per cent, and then further increased from
2005 to 2008 by 9.1 per cent. For most
regions, greater audit regulation change has
occurred from 2002 to 2005, a period in which
independent audit oversight boards and auditor
rotation has been introduced after a series of
high-profile accounting/auditing scandals took
place in the beginning of millennium. Still
there is great variation across regions and
periods.

DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS
This study has demonstrated the importance of
understanding the impact of several sets of
variables on national regulatory choices in
auditing. The four sets of variables are national
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culture, religious affiliation and felt importance, legal code and the finance variable
market liquidity. We deal with each of these in
turn, beginning with national culture.
We studied the impact of national culture, as
measured by Hofstede’s Individualism/Collectivism construct, Power Distance and his
Uncertainty Avoidance construct on the
determinants of audit regulation in a final
sample of 46 nations. Individualism (IND) was
positively related to auditing regulation, but
UA and PD were not. We noted earlier in the
paper that greater uncertainty avoidance could
lend itself to greater regulation or it may not.
As noted, one possible intervening variable that
might diminish the likelihood of greater
uncertainty avoidance being associated with
greater auditing enforcement is distrust of
government. Similarly with Power Distance,
greater disparities in power may work may lead
to the desire to avoid further enshrinement of
the most powerful individuals and institutions
in the regulatory structure. On the other hand,
more powerful regulatory institutions may act
as counterbalances to private power, privately
exercised. In order to understand (a) whether
there would be a possible contest between old
power and new power, it is necessary to
understand (b) the nature of the process for
selecting people to serve on regulatory boards,
as well as (c) whether there are pressures on
them to keep performing their roles in a normative fashion. We suggest that future research
address the role that distrust of government
plays in this result, if any. Future research
should also address—societally—whether there
are widespread perceptions of revolving doors
between regulatory agencies and the industries
they are supposed to monitor. Such revolving
doors may lead to regulatory capture. Even
apart from regulatory capture, there may be a
perception that individuals in high places
become cognitively captured by the industries
they regulate, and therefore are able to function only minimally (e.g., Black, 7/23/2012;
Little, 7/12/2012; Bazerman and Moore,
2011; Bloomberg, 4/20/2015). Our results on
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the culture variables illustrate the importance
of taking national culture into account in crossnational studies of regulatory effort. That the
results might, from one frame of reference,
seem surprising underlines even more strongly
the importance of the finding shown.
The second set of variables studied here
were religion variables. Kleinman et al (2014)
argued strongly for the importance of understanding the impact of religion on auditing
regulatory choices. Following their lead, we
empirically studied these impacts here. Collectively, these faiths make up most (76.8 per
cent) of the world’s population (http://www.
pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religiouslandscape-exec/). We found that, using
CHRST_OTH as a reference group, several
religious variables were significantly related to
auditing regulation. The pattern of results displayed here argues strongly for a sustained
research program aimed at understanding this
result. It may very well be that members of
communities that identify themselves as
belonging to one religion or another exhibit
less need for greater auditing enforcement. It is
as if Voltaire thought that since his valet was
religious, believing in God, there was no need
to lock up his spoons. Accordingly, a felt
attachment to religion, and to specific religions
in contrast to another, may result in more
comfort with reigning political and economic
arrangements.
In this regard, we also tested the relationship
of the percentage of the population who felt
that religion was very important to them
(ReligionImportant) and auditing enforcement
(AUDIT2008). We found that the importance
of religion was negatively and significantly
related to auditing enforcement but not to the
change in auditing enforcement regulatory
efforts (as measured by structure in the BPT
2014 study) between 2002 and 2008 (ChAUDIT08_02). These results suggest that societies
in which individuals hold religion to be more
important to them find less need to have government regulation as a replacement for
inwardly driven behavior. It may be that soci-

eties characterized by a greater belief in the
importance of religion are more trusting of
others than societies in which a smaller percentage of people hold to the importance of
religion. We believe that this would be a very
fruitful area for further research. Durant and
Durant (1968, e-book edition, no page number
shown) note that, ‘‘As education spreads, theologies lose credence, and receive an external
conformity without influence upon conduct or
hope.[emphasis added]’’ In Durant and Durant’s
terms then, less credence placed in religion leads
to poorer behaviors than otherwise would obtain,
an assertion consistent with our argument here.
The results for the ReligionImportant variable,
as with the religious variables, seem of a piece
with this and underline the need for a program
of research focused on developing a better
understanding of the result.
Also, we tested against the enforcement
variable was the market liquidity variable.
Greater
market
liquidity
(MarketLIQUIDITY2008) was found to be
strongly and positively related to auditing
regulation (AUDIT2008). A key argument for
auditing, and therefore auditing regulation, is
to promote confidence in the financial markets. Confidence in auditing regulation,
therefore, should be associated with greater
market liquidity as individuals feel comfortable engaging in trade. This argument is supported here. The failure of the analog change
variable Dif_MarketLiquid08_02 to be significant in predicting ChAUDIT08_02 is puzzling. Future researchers should consider
examining this relationship further.
Next, we addressed the relationship of the
old chestnut of legal system origins (common
law versus civil code) and auditing enforcement. We found, consistent with so much of
the literature and in contrast to Lindahl and
Schadewitz’s argument, that legal system
(LEGAL) matters. The presence of a common
law legal system was positively, and therefore
civil code negatively, associated with auditing
enforcement (AUDIT2008). It was also positively and significantly related to the change in
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auditing enforcement from 2002 to 2008
(ChAUDIT08_02). Given the cost of litigation, and the fear of it amongst the giant
accounting firms and others, it makes sense that
a legal source—common law—more favorable
to investor protection would also foster greater
regulation of auditing. An interesting additional study would be to examine on a case-bycase basis the influence of the auditing profession in helping to generate greater auditing
enforcement activity. Greater auditing
enforcement activity has benefits to all auditing
firms. For one thing, if all auditing firms fear
the regulatory stroke, then all auditing firms
have less to fear from rival firms undercutting
their own position with their clients (e.g.,
Kleinman et al, 2014; Anandarajan, Kleinman
and Palmon, 2012). Clearly auditing firms
must be concerned with the behavior of their
clients and having a strong accounting regulatory body may inhibit game playing by the
clients. It is the auditor’s job to supplement any
mechanisms that the client itself has, if any, for
fostering compliance with accounting rules.
The mechanisms by which this supplementation should happen, however, are unclear.
That said, of course, auditing firms can always
hope to take advantage of regulatory blind
spots or other weaknesses (e.g., regulatory
capture) and hope to successfully engage in
activities contrary to the rules. A hope may be
that other auditors are captured in what there is
of a regulatory net, but that they themselves
will not be (e.g., Kleinman and Palmon,
2000, 2001). More grounded-theory work on
the nature of auditor–client relationships needs
to be done, taking into consideration the
current regulatory environment. Beattie et al
(2001) present case studies of the interactions
of auditors and clients over accounting issues.
More, and broader, such work needs to be
done, work that takes into account cross-national auditing settings and very different cultural environments. The Beattie et al (2001)
study used a sample of 6 United Kingdom
companies. Given the accelerating trends
toward globalization, more attention has to be
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paid elsewhere, in many settings. Subsequent
work should also take into account the results
in Table 8, which shows that changes in the
pace of regulation differed substantially
between countries and between regions of the
globe. Further study should be done examining
whether there are local events that caused
different levels of movement toward further
auditing regulation.
The limitations of this study include the
sample size available. Regrettably, much international accounting research uses relatively small
sample sizes (see for example, Table 1, Garcı́a
Lara et al, 2006). Missing value issues are rife as
are, especially in questionnaire-driven studies,
issues as to the comparability of answers to the
same question when rendered in many different
environments. A strength of this study is that the
measures used were created by international
authorities (e.g., the World Bank) on such
research or by organizations like that of Geert
Hofstede (geert-hofstede.com) whose work has
been widely used and therefore extensively
vetted before publication in many very highly
esteemed journals. Clearly, this research raises
many questions. But the point of research is to
raise questions as well as to answer them. As
Firestein (2012) notes, ignorance drives science
and the search for new answers results in discovering new areas of ignorance, necessitating
more research. In this paper, we believe we
have provided very interesting additional questions for research to address.

NOTES
1 Gottschall (2012) was an electronic edition.
No page numbers were provided therein.
2 The oft expected relationship between
religion and behavior was nicely voiced by
the 18th century French Philosophe Voltaire when he said, ‘‘I don’t believe in God,
but I hope my valet does so he won’t steal
my spoons.’’ (Herman, 2013, p. 233).
3 Since in percentage counts of religious
adherents within a society, the total of all
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4

5

6

7

8

9

religious categories must sum to 100 per
cent, using the Protestant religion as a
touchstone also avoids multicollinearity
issues.
For an interesting view on the similarity of
values across cultures, across centuries, see
Schwitzgebel (2/19/2015).
Kolko (1963), however, might argue that
regulation is the capture of the state by
special interests in order to fend off other
challenges to those interests or limit (‘destructive’) competition between those interests. In Kolko’s terms, therefore, greater
regulation may serve to bound competition
and ward off expensive litigation or even
greater attention to the affairs of business
and accounting firms than would be the
case without a preventive, reassuring to the
greater polity, set of regulations. In effect,
this would be regulation to protect capitalists from the effects of capitalism.
We also tested the effect of the independent
variables on changes in the audit enforcement index measure between 2002 and
2005 and 2005 and 2008. We found that
the regression model itself was not significant in these regressions. Perhaps the time
period was too short for much change to
occur and be reflected in the regression
results.
In separate regressions, we created interaction variables consisting of the importance
of religion variable and the religion/percentage variables but found that the regression runs using these interaction variables
were highly multicollinear.
We also ran the change regression for the
period of 2002–2005 and 2005–2008 and
did not find significant results on most of
the main test variables.
The first difference method is commonly
used as one of remedies to mitigate autocorrelation concern when time series data
are involved (chapter 12, Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter and Li, 5th Ed).
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